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1 Introduction
Academic economists and practitioners have long debated over the eﬀects of Þnancial
globalization on growth.1 The removal of restrictions on international capital transactions
has on some occasions been welcome as a growth opportunity and in others blamed for
triggering Þnancial instability and banking crises. Yet, this debate has not addressed
empirically the mechanism through which Þnancial liberalization aﬀects growth. How do
the main sources of growth - total factor productivity (TFP) and capital accumulation -
react to Þnancial globalization? This issue is of particular relevance for at least two reasons.
First, understanding how TFP and investments are aﬀected by Þnancial liberalization
would allow us to identify which models are more appropriate to analyze and predict
the economic eﬀects of Þnancial globalization. Second, answering the question above
would greatly help understand the welfare eﬀects of Þnancial integration. Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2006) show that, whether capital or TFP react to Þnancial openness, matters
signiÞcantly for the size of welfare gains (or losses).2 There are, to my knowledge, no
studies that address this important issue. This paper is a Þrst attempt at disentangling
the eﬀects of Þnancial globalization on productivity and capital accumulation.
The theoretical literature proposes various mechanisms through which Þnancial glob-
alization may aﬀect economic performance. In a standard neo-classical framework, open-
ing international capital markets generates capital ßows from capital-abundant towards
capital-scarse countries, thereby aﬀecting growth in the poor countries through an accel-
eration in the convergence process. This eﬀect however is short-lived, since the steady
state (or the balanced growth path) is not aﬀected. This argument would Þnd empirical
support if capital accumulation in poor countries accelerated after Þnancial liberalization,
and TFP did not react. If credit rationing were added to the neo-classical framework
above, also productivity might be expected to increase, to the extent that capital inßows
make more productive investments possible by relieving the economy from credit con-
straints (as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997). The Þndings (e.g. in Lucas, 1990) that
capital does not ßow from rich to poor countries though, seems to make these mechanisms
less likely to apply. International capital mobility may also allow investors to diversify
risks by holding foreign assets, as suggested by Obstfeld (1994). Better portfolio insurance
fosters investments in risky projects with high expected productivity, as well as savings.
1Here Þnancial globalization is meant to be the absence of restrictions to international Þnancial trans-
actions. Henceforth, I will equivalently refer to it as (international) Þnancial liberalization, Þnancial
integration, or Þnancial openness.
2Their quantitative exercise points out that the beneÞts from an acceleration in capital accumulation
along the convergence to the steady state, are way smaller (up to a Þftieth) than the gains from an
improvement in productivity, hence in the steady state to which the economy converges.
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While higher savings would imply a positive eﬀect on capital accumulation, the outcome
of international portfolio reallocation on capital and productivity would vary across coun-
tries, hence be undetermined on aggregate. Yet another approach could be considering
Þnancial globalization similar to trade in goods. By exerting a pro-competitive eﬀect on
the capital markets, Þnancial openness would induce Þrms of all countries to use capi-
tal more eﬃciently, thereby raising productivity without necessarily causing capital ßows
across countries. As trade in goods, Þnancial integration might also foster specialization in
Þnancial services, which would improve allocative eﬃciency by allowing good Þrms to bor-
row at better conditions through specialized foreign intermediaries. Also, by giving Þrms
access to a wider range of Þnancial services, integration may allow them to use the most
appropriate ones, thereby gaining in eﬃciency. Capital accumulation might eventually
follow the increase in productivity.
All of these models support the view that Þnancial integration aﬀects positively eco-
nomic performance. However, in a world characterized by market imperfections and weak
institutions, Þnancial integration could open the door to speculation, misallocation of cap-
ital and Þnancial instability (as for instance in Rodrick, 1998 and Stiglitz, 2000), thereby
aﬀecting negatively economic performance.
The models above give diﬀerent predictions on the eﬀects of Þnancial globalization
on productivity and capital accumulation. In general, if openness only fosters capital
accumulation, accelerating convergence, its positive eﬀect is expected to be short-lived.
If instead it raises TFP, it is most likely to spur long-term growth. Understanding what
model is supported by the empirical evidence may be of great help to Þgure out if Þnancial
globalization has temporary or long-lasting eﬀects on the wealth of nations.
To investigate the mechanism through which international Þnancial liberalization af-
fects capital accumulation and TFP, I also control for two indirect channels. First, Þ-
nancial globalization may foster Þnancial development (see Klein and Olivei, 1999), i.e.
the availability of external Þnance to the private sector, which Beck et al. (2000) show
to aﬀect positively productivity but not investments.3 Including a measure of Þnancial
depth, such as the ratio of credit to the private sector over GDP, allows me to disentangle
the importance of this channel.
As another indirect channel, Þnancial liberalization may trigger Þnancial instability
and banking crises, as a wide literature points out (see Aizenman, 2001 for a survey on
the evidence on Þnancial liberalization and crises). Whatever the mechanism generating
3Financial development can be deÞned as the ability of a Þnancial system to reduce information asym-
metries between investors and borrowers, trade and diversify risk, mobilize and pool savings, and ease
transactions. Removing restrictions on international Þnancial transactions (Þnancial liberalization) may
aﬀect the way a Þnancial system carries over its functions, hence Þnancial development.
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banking crises, such events may harm the ability of a Þnancial system to provide the
economy with credit. As a consequence, both investments in physical capital and inno-
vation can be expected to slow down. In the worst scenario, TFP might even drop, due
to the need for shutting down productive projects. I account for the eﬀects of Þnancial
instability by controlling all regressions for an indicator of banking crises. In this way, any
indirect eﬀect of liberalization through crises is removed from the estimates for the index
of Þnancial liberalization. I also estimate the joint eﬀect of crises and liberalization and I
explicitly address the link between Þnancial liberalization and banking crises by means of
multinomial logit regressions.
I follow three methodologies to assess the eﬀects of Þnancial liberalization and banking
crises on investments and productivity, and a fourth to address the link between liberal-
ization and crises. Using de iure indicators of Þnancial integration, I perform diﬀerence
in diﬀerences estimation of the impact of regime switches, between capital restrictions
and openness, and between crises and normal times. To this end, I use a panel data with
yearly observations from at most 93 countries over the period 1975-1999. I then turn to the
long-run analysis and estimate equations for TFP and capital growth rates as a function
of initial productivity and capital stock respectively, Þnancial globalization and the other
controls over a period of 25 year in a sample of 85 countries. To overcome problems of
unobserved country-speciÞc eﬀects and endogeneity of regressors, typical of cross-sectional
estimates, I adopt the system GMM dynamic panel technique proposed by Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). To assess whether Þnancial liberalization
favors the occurrence of banking crises, I estimate on the annual panel dataset a series
of linear probability models for an indicator of systemic and borderline crises (see Caprio
and Klingebiel, 2002).
The main results are the following. (1) International Þnancial liberalization has a
positive direct eﬀect on TFP, while it has no direct eﬀect on capital accumulation. (2)
Financial integration has a positive, lagged eﬀect on capital, since investments follow
TFP. (3) Banking crises harm both capital accumulation and productivity. However,
(4) Þnancial liberalization raises only the probability that minor banking crises occur in
developed countries.
This paper is mainly related to three strands of literature. The literature on growth
and development accounting has shown that a large share of cross-country diﬀerences in
economic performance is driven by total factor productivity (TFP) rather than factor
accumulation (physical and human capital).4 Hall and Jones (1999) point out that a
4See Caselli (2005) for a survey on the develpment accounting literature, and Easterly and Levine (2001)
for the stylized facts on development and growth accounting.
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substantial share of the variation in GDP per worker is explained by diﬀerences in TFP
and provide evidence that productivity is to a large extent determined by institutional
factors. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) show that also GDP growth diﬀerentials are
mainly accounted for by diﬀerences in the growth rates of TFP. These results suggest that,
if Þnancial globalization is to aﬀect the wealth of nations, it is more likely to do it through
its impact on TFP, rather than factor accumulation. This is indeed the main empirical
result of the paper.
Several authors suggest that Þnancial development spurs GDP growth by fostering
productivity growth, not only by raising the funds available for accumulation. Theoretical
papers by Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2005), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Aghion,
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005b) among others show that Þnancial development may
relieve risky innovators from credit constraints, thereby fostering growth through techno-
logical change. While earlier contributions (e.g., Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990) suggest
that Þnancial development fosters growth simply by increasing participation in production
and risk pooling, in the later works the relationship is also driven by advances in produc-
tivity. King and Levine (1993), and, in more detail, Beck Levine and Loayza (2000) show
evidence of a strong eﬀect of Þnancial development on TFP growth, and only a tenuous
eﬀect on physical capital accumulation.
Many papers, extensively summarized in Prasad et al. (2003 and 2006) address the
eﬀects of Þnancial globalization on economic growth and volatility, from diﬀerent perspec-
tives and with various datasets and empirical methodologies. Some studies (for instance,
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995, Kraay, 2000 and Rodrick, 1998) found that Þnancial liber-
alization does not aﬀect growth, others that the eﬀect is positive (Levine, 2001, Bekaert et
al., 2003 and BonÞglioli and Mendicino, 2004), yet others that it is negative (Eichengreen
and Leblang, 2003). These eﬀects are also shown to be heterogeneous across countries at
diﬀerent stages of institutional and economic development (see Bekaert et al, 2003, Chinn
and Ito, 2003 and Edwards, 2001) and countries with diﬀerent macroeconomic frameworks
(Arteta Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2001). Perhaps surprisingly, very little evidence exists
on the eﬀects of Þnancial globalization on the main sources of growth: productivity and
capital accumulation.5 Chari and Henry (2002) Þnd signiÞcant eﬀects of equity market
liberalization on investments and the Tobins Q of listed Þrms, and conclude that these
must be driven by changes in productivity, which they do not explore directly. A call for
studies on the relationship between Þnancial globalization and productivity is in Kose et
al. (2006)
5Some preliminary evidence on Þnancial integration and productivity is in Kose, Prasad and Terrones
(2006).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview
on growth and development accounting, which leads on to the discussion of my empirical
strategy. In section 3, I describe the dataset and the variables I use in the analysis. Section
4 presents the econometric methodologies and reports the results from the estimation of
the equations for investments and TFP. Section 5 shows the estimates of the impact of
Þnancial integration on the probability that banking crises occur, and derives its indirect
eﬀects on productivity and capital accumulation. Section 6 discusses the evidence in the
previous sections and proposes an explanation that is in line with the results of other
empirical studies. Section 7 concludes.
2 The empirical strategy
The literature on growth and developing accounting takes as starting point the Cobb
Douglas speciÞcation for the aggregate production function,
Y = AKα (HL)1−α , (1)
where K is the aggregate capital stock, L the number of workers and H their average
human capital. The term A represents the eﬃciency in the use of factors, and corresponds
to the notion of total factor productivity (TFP). Several contributions on development
accounting (see Caselli, 2005 for a survey and Hall and Jones, 1999) have shown that a
large share of the cross-country variation in GDP per worker, YL , is explained by diﬀerences
in A. The works on growth accounting (see Easterly and Levine, 2001 and Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare, 1997), starting from the following decomposition
Y˙
Y
=
A˙
A
+ α
K˙
K
+ (1− α)
Ã
H˙
H
+
L˙
L
!
, (2)
have shown that also cross-country diﬀerentials in GDP growth are to a large extent
generated by diﬀerentials in productivity growth ( A˙A).
All studies on the impact of Þnancial liberalization on growth have focused on the left
hand side of (2), estimating various versions of the equation:
dyit = b0 + b1yit−1 + b02Zit + b3IFLit + eit, (3)
where dyit ≡ d log (Yit) is the growth rate of GDP in country i, yit−1 is the logarithm
of lagged GDP, Zit is a vector of control variables, IFLit is an indicator of Þnancial
liberalization, and eit is the error term.
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This paper instead considers the right hand side of (2) and proposes estimates of the
following equation:
Pit = β0 + β
0
1Xit + γIFLit + uit,
where Pit represents in turn A, K or their growth rates in country i at time t, X is a vector
of control variables, IFL the indicator of Þnancial integration, and u the error term.
3 The data
I perform the analysis on an unbalanced panel dataset with annual observations for 93
countries, spanning from 1975 to 1999. Depending on the econometric methodology in
use, I consider, in turn, the whole yearly panel, a cross-section of 85 countries with data
averaged over the sample period, and a panel comprising up to 91 countries with non-
overlapping Þve-year observations over the same period. As Table A shows, the largest
sample includes twenty-two developed and seventy-one developing countries from all con-
tinents. The following subsections describe the main variables I include in the regressions.
3.1 Capital accumulation
I construct the series of the physical capital stocks, K, applying the perpetual inventory
method as in Hall and Jones (1999) on data from the Penn World Tables 6.1. I estimate
the initial stock of capital, Kt0 as
It0
g+δ , where g is the average geometric growth rate of
total investments between t0 and t0+ 10.6 In the paper t0 is 1960, since I have data on
investments dating back to that year for most countries.7 A depreciation rate δ of 6 per
cent in ten years is assumed. The following values of the capital stock are easily computed
as Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1+ It.
3.2 Productivity
I construct the series of total factor productivity following the Hall and Jones (1999)
approach to the decomposition of output. I assume the production function in country i
to be
Yi =K
α
i (AiHiLi)
1−α ,
where Yi is the output produced in country i, Ki is the stock of physical capital in use, Ai
is labor-augmenting productivity, Li is the labor in use (rgdpch* pop/ rgdpwok from the
PWT 6.1), and Hi is a measure of the average human capital of workers (HiLi is therefore
6 Investments are deÞned as I = ki*rgdpch*pop from the PWT 6.1.
7 In the countries which have no data for 1960 t0 is the Þrst year followed by at least 15 observations.
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human capital-augmented labor).8 The factor share α is assumed constant across countries
and equal to 1/3, which matches national account data for developed countries. I adopt
the following speciÞcation for labor-augmenting human capital as a function of the years
of schooling, si:
Hi = e
φ(si).
I rely on the results of Psacharopulos (1994) survey and specify φ (si) as a piecewise linear
function with coeﬃcients 0.134 for the Þrst four years of education, 0.101 for the next four
years, and 0.068 for any value of si > 8.
Equipped with data on capital, output per worker, population and schooling (from
Barro and Lee, 2001), I can compute the series of total factor productivity as
Ai =
Yi
Li
1
Hi
µ
Ki
Yi
¶− α
1−α
.
3.3 Financial integration
I proxy Þnancial integration with a 0-1 indicator, which relies on de iure criteria. The
variable IFL is a dummy that takes value 0 if a country has held restrictions on capital
account transactions during the year, and 1 otherwise. The existence of restrictions is
classiÞed on a 0-1 basis by the IMF in its Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), which is available for a maximum of 212 countries over
the period 1967- 1996.9 Despite its limits, summarized in Edison et al. (2002), this is the
most commonly used indicator of international Þnancial liberalization.
For robustness check, I will also use another de iure indicator, that relies on the
chronology of oﬃcial equity market liberalization, available in Bekaert et al. (2003) for
95 countries from 1980 onwards. It takes value 1 if international equity trading is allowed
in a given country-year, and 0 otherwise. This dummy variable, EML, diﬀers from IFL
because it only accounts for equity market liberalization and not, for instance, credit
market liberalization. As opposed to IFL, it does not include policy reversals: it labels a
country as open ever since its Þrst year of liberalization.
8 In Hall and Jones (1999) Yi is rgdpch*pop from the PWT, net of the value-added of the mining
industry. Following Caselli (2005), I simplify and take rgdpch*pop.
9ClassiÞcation methods have changed in 1996, so that there are now 13 separate indexes that can hardly
be compared to the previous single indicator. Miniane (2000) harmonized the classiÞcations, though for a
limited number of countries, and over a short time span.
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3.4 Control variables
When assessing the eﬀects of Þnancial liberalization on capital accumulation and produc-
tivity, I control for a number of variables.
 Banking crises. I adopt a zero-one anecdotal indicator of bank crises, proposed by
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), who keep record of 117 systemic and 51 non-systemic
crises occurring in 93 and 45 countries respectively, from the late 1970s and onwards.
On a yearly base, the variable BC takes value 2 or 1 if the country has experienced
a systemic or borderline banking crisis, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Caprio and
Kilingebiel label a crisis as systemic if a substancial proportion of banks capital has
been exhausted and borderline if the losses were less severe. To make this deÞnition
criterion clearer, I refer to a few episodes. The 1991 crisis in Sweden as well as
the 1998-99 crisis in Russia were systemic, since they involved insolvency or serious
diﬃculties for 90 and 45 per cent of the banking system, respectively. The isolated
failures of three UK banks between the eighties and the nineties, as well as the
solvency problems of Credit Lyonnais in France in 1994-95, are instead labeled as
borderline crises.
 Financial depth. I proxy it with the ratio of total credit to the private sector over
GDP (privo from Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2001) and its growth rate. This variable
gives a measure of the external Þnance available to Þrms. Klein and Olivei (1999)
and Levine (2001) show that Þnancial liberalization promotes Þnancial development,
which, according to Beck et al. (2000), may be expected to foster productivity
more than capital accumulation. BonÞglioli and Mendicino (2004) also Þnd that
banking crises have a negative eﬀect on privo, mainly where institutions are weak.
Controlling for Þnancial depth in the equations for both investments and productivity
helps disentangle the direct eﬀect of liberalization and crises from the indirect one
through Þnancial development. A recent literature on Þnancial fragility points out
that crises may come along as by-products of sustained growth of the Þnancial system
(see Ranciere et al., 2004 and Tornell et al., 2004). Feijen and Perotti (2005) suggest
that equilibria with Þnancial fragility and high participation in the Þnancial market
may arise where political accountability is not very high and wealth inequality is
high. Including privo and its growth rate in the logit regressions for banking crises
allows me to test a reduced form of these theoretical predictions.
 Initial real per capita GDP (rgdpch from the PWT 6.1) accounts for diﬀerent
stages of economic development. It is often claimed that richer countries are more
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likely to have open Þnancial markets, hence the eﬀect of Þnancial liberalization
might seem spurious if initial GDP is not controlled for. If adding this variable
to the regressions does not take away signiÞcance from the coeﬃcient for Þnancial
liberalization, the suspects of spuriousness are less sound.
 I include government expenditure as a ratio of GDP (kg from the PWT 6.1) in
the regressions for capital accumulation. Several theories predict that government
expenditure crowds out private investments. If this is the case, I should expect a
negative coeﬃcient in the equation for capital accumulation.
 I control for openness to trade, proxied by import plus export as a ratio of GDP
(openk from the PWT 6.1). Trade may aﬀect the eﬃciency of an economy through
several channels, such as specialization according to comparative advantage, access
to larger markets with more product variety and increased competition. These eﬀects
may in turn stimulate both capital accumulation and productivity growth.
 Intellectual property right protection is expected to enhance productivity by
giving incentives for innovation. This is controlled for by using the measure (ipr) by
Ginarte and Park (1997), which is available for Þve-year periods from 1960 to 1990.
 Deposit insurance. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) show that the exis-
tence of explicit deposit insurance increases the likelihood of bank runs and thus
crises of the banking sector. Hence, I include a measure of deposit insurance
(depins) from Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci (2000) in the logit analysis for banking
crises.
 I also control for inflation (from the World Development Indicators) in the logit for
banking crises. I take this variable as an indicator of bad macroeconomic policies,
which are likely to make a country prone to crises.
 Finally, I use indicators of economic and institutional development to check
for heterogeneity in the eﬀects of Þnancial liberalization and banking crises on both
investments and productivity. In the cross-sectional estimates for TFP growth I ex-
plicitly control for institutional quality using the Government Anti-Diversion Policy
index (gadp, from Hall and Jones, 1999) as a proxy. As an indicator of economic
development, I construct a dummy (developing) that takes value 1 if the country
is deÞned as low or middle-low income in the World Development Indicators, and 0
otherwise. In the panel regressions, I use these indicators to split the sample and
construct interactive terms.
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4 The empirical analysis
This section explains the methodologies I follow to assess the eﬀects of Þnancial integration
on capital accumulation and productivity, and reports the results. I Þrst present the
diﬀerence in diﬀerence approach applied to yearly panel data, then I turn to the long-
run cross-sectional analysis using twenty-Þve year averages, to conclude with the dynamic
panel regressions performed on non-overlapping Þve-year observations.
4.1 Panel difference in difference
I fully exploit the cross-sectional and time-series information in the annual dataset and
estimate
Pit = β0 + β
0
1Xit−1 + γIFLit−1 + ηi + νt + εit, (4)
where Pit is a proxy for the outcome variable (either d log(K), d log(A) or log(A) in the
various speciÞcations) observed in country i at year t, X are control variables including
the indicator of banking crises BC, IFL is a dummy for Þnancial liberalization. To
alleviate the simultaneity bias, all regressors enter as lagged values. ηi is a country-
speciÞc Þxed eﬀect capturing heterogeneity in the determinants of P that are speciÞc to
i. Its inclusion in (4) implies that γ is only estimated from the within-country variation
around the liberalization date. The Þxed year eﬀects (νt) allow me to compare the change
in P between the pre and post-reform periods in countries that have liberalized with the
change in the countries that maintained the restrictions. This means that equation (4) is a
diﬀerence in diﬀerences speciÞcation, since it implies diﬀerencing out the time-mean for
each i, and the common trend for all is at any t. Two main problems may undermine the
ability of γ to identify a causal link from Þnancial liberalization to the sources of growth.
First, there may be concerns about the selection of the countries that liberalized. Sup-
pose that fewer episodes of liberalization were observed among countries that share a cer-
tain characteristic C, and that the countries with characteristic C experienced particularly
low productivity. Then this trend in productivity, speciÞc to countries with characteristic
C, may bias the estimated eﬀect of Þnancial integration upwards. To tackle this issue, I
Þrst identify the most important factors that inßuence the decision to liberalize capital
account transactions, by estimating the following logit on the annual panel dataset:
Pr (IFL_rit = 1) =
eβo+β1Xit
1 + eβo+β1Xit
.
IFL_rit is an indicator of the reforms observed in country i at time t, and Xit is a
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set of covariates.10 IFL_r equals 0 if there are no reforms, 1 if a switch into capital
account liberalization occurs, -1 if the switch is out of it. The estimation is performed
with a multinomial logit.11 All standard errors are robust and clustered by country. The
coeﬃcient estimates in Table B indicate geographical dummies among the best predictors
of reforms.12 After Þnding a geographical pattern in the selection of liberalized countries,
I check if there are systematic diﬀerences in productivity and investments across areas
(Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe + North America). Table C reports the number of
observations with Þnancial liberalization reforms (rows 1-2), the number of country-years
with open capital markets (row 3), and the means of TPF growth and capital accumulation
across continents. Note from rows 1 and 2 that Africa, accounting for almost half of the
sample, has the least number of capital account reforms and a very bad performance
in terms of productivity growth. On the other hand, Europe and North America have
the highest incidence of unreverted capital account liberalizations, the best performance
in terms of productivity and the worst in capital accumulation. This suggest that the
diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimates for γ might be aﬀected by selection bias. To amend
this bias, I control the diﬀerence in diﬀerence regressions for continental trends in both
productivity and capital accumulation.
A problem of endogeneity of policy changes may also arise. Suppose a country opens
up when experiencing an economic crisis to help the recovery or alternatively when it is
already on a sustained growth path. This may attribute a negative or positive eﬀect to Þ-
nancial liberalization which is actually due to a trend, thereby producing biased estimates.
As a solution to this problem, I control for a dummy taking value 1 during the three or
Þve years prior to the liberalization and zero otherwise. Comparing the coeﬃcient for this
dummy with γ allows me to verify whether the change in P was part of a previous trend
or caused by liberalization. As a robustness check, I replace the dummy variable with a
trend variable, taking values 1, 2 and 3, respectively three, two and one years before the
reform. Moreover, I assess whether both reforms into and out of Þnancial liberalization
10Following Bekaert et al. (2003), I include among the covariates a measure of institutional quality
(gadp), and the lagged values of real per capita GDP (rgdpch), government expenditure (kg), openness to
trade (openk), Þnancial depth (privo), inßation, per capita GDP growth, capital stock (k) and TFP(a). I
also control for the occurrence of banking crises in the previous year (BC), economic development (devel-
oping) and continental dummies.
11All results are robust to the use of logit and probit on separate indicators: IFL_in (1 for switches
into capital account liberalization, and 0 otherwise) and IFL_out (1 for switches out of capital account
liberalization, and 0 otherwise).
12Both inßation and Þnancial development reduce the likelihood that Þnancial restrictions are removed.
Neither the initial stock of capital nor the level of productivity are associated to switches into and out
of Þnancial liberalization, suggesting that endogeneity of Þnancial integration with respect to capital and
productivity may be not a major concern. The occurrence of banking crises does not seem to aﬀect
signiÞcantly the decision to abandon, nor to adopt, restrictions on international capital transactions.
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(opening when a country is closed and closing when a country is open) promote economic
performance, to test if countries systematically adopt the reform that fosters growth.
A concern about the consistency of diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimators may arise if the
dependent variable is autocorrelated, as pointed out by Bertrand et al. (2004). In this
case, the standard errors of the coeﬃcient γ would be underestimated, thereby biasing the
t-statistics towards over-rejection of the null γ = 0. Bertrand et al. (2004) propose several
methods to get around this problem. I will follow their suggestion and estimate equation
(4) without IFL, save the residuals only for the countries that experienced a reform, and
regress them on IFL.13 This is equivalent to identifying γ oﬀ the diﬀerence in the residuals
before and after the reform.
4.1.1 Capital accumulation
Table 1 reports the results from the diﬀerence in diﬀerence regressions of the growth
rate of capital, d log(K), on yearly data.14 The speciÞcation in columns 1 and 2 only
includes the indicator of Þnancial liberalization (IFL), whose eﬀects on investments are
nil. These coeﬃcients are robust to controlling for trends in investments up to three
years prior to liberalization (IFL_switch3) and for time-continent eﬀects, as reported in
column 2.15 Columns 3 and 4 show that banking crises (BC) have a negative eﬀect on
capital accumulation, and that Þnancial integration still seems to be irrelevant Column
5 suggests that banking crises have no diﬀerent eﬀect across Þnancially open and closed
countries. When I control for real per capita GDP, government expenditure as a ratio
of GDP and credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP (column 6), IFL remains
insigniÞcant, while the negative coeﬃcient for BC becomes only marginally signiÞcant (it
is diﬀerent from zero at the ten per cent level). However its signiÞcance is fully restored
when any of the additional controls is removed from the regression (result not reported).
The coeﬃcients in column 6 also show that richer countries accumulate more capital, while
government expenditure tends to crowd out investments. Moreover, the growth rate of
physical capital is lower where Þnancial intermediation (as proxied by privo) is higher
and has grown less (the latter result is not reported, but available upon request). This
suggests that countries invest more in physical capital when their Þnancial systems are at
early stages of development and growing rapidly. Columns 7 and 8 report the estimates for
13This procedure is referred to as ignoring time series information in Bertrand et al. (2004).
14The evidence is robust to the use of investments as a ratio of GDP as a proxy of the dependent variable.
The results are availablie upon request.
15The results do not change if I use IFL_switch5, which equals 1 for the Þve years prior to the reform.
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the subsamples of developed and developing countries, as deÞned by the World Bank.16
Interestingly, capital account liberalization has a positive eﬀect on investments in the
developed countries, and no impact in the others. As in column 6, removing any of the
additional controls restores the negative coeﬃcient for BC, without aﬀecting the positive
estimate for IFL in the developed countries. Finally, the results are robust to the inclusion
of openness to trade, whose coeﬃcient always turns out to be insigniÞcant and is thus
omitted.
4.1.2 Productivity
Tables 2a and 2b report the results from the diﬀerence in diﬀerence regressions of TFP
levels, log (A), on yearly data. The coeﬃcients for IFL reported in Table 2a are positive
and signiÞcant across all speciÞcations in columns 1-6. Columns 7-8 though suggest that
the positive eﬀect is more pronounced in the developing countries. Banking crises have
a negative and signiÞcant eﬀect on TFP under all speciÞcations. Note that when I add
intellectual property rights protection (ipr) among the regressors, twenty countries drop
out of the sample due to missing observations. Nevertheless, the estimates for IFL and
BC in the equations of columns 1-4 do not change if I restrict the sample. Interestingly, the
coeﬃcients for privo in columns 6-8 suggest that Þnancial development on average tends
to have a positive eﬀect on productivity. However, its eﬀect is positive in the developing
countries and negative in the developed ones. This result may support the hypothesis
that Þnancial development favors convergence in productivity. Notice that the coeﬃcients
for Þnancial liberalization and banking crises remain signiÞcant, even after controlling for
Þnancial development. This suggest that both have a direct eﬀect on productivity. The
coeﬃcient estimates for ipr conÞrm the expectations of a positive eﬀect on TFP, mainly
in the developed countries where R&D capacity is probably higher.
Table 2b reports robustness checks on the diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimates of Table
2a, column 6. The Þrst two columns refer to the correction proposed by Bertand et al.
(2004). In column 1, I report the results from regressing TFP on all control variables
but IFL, country and time Þxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcients for Þnancial development and
intellectual property rights protection do not change with respect to Table 1. I saved the
residuals from the estimation in column 1 only for the countries that experienced a regime
shift relative to IFL, and regressed them on IFL. The coeﬃcient and its standard error in
column 2 conÞrm that Þnancial integration raises signiÞcantly productivity by 8 per cent.
16Heterogeneity in the eﬀects of Þnancial liberalization could also be addressed by including an interacted
dummy IFL∗ developing in the full-sample regression. This method, however, may deliver biased estimates
if there is heterogeneity in other coeﬃcients.
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In columns 3 and 4 I try to identify the eﬀect of a policy change out of Þnancial openness.
In column 3, I restrict the attention to those countries that were not closed all the time,
and regress productivity on the usual controls plus an indicator that takes value one if
there is not Þnancial openness and zero otherwise. In this way, the coeﬃcient compares
the change in TFP before and after the adoption of restrictions in the countries that closed
their Þnancial markets with the change in TFP in the countries that remained open. The
eﬀect is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. In column 4, I take the full sample and regress
TFP on an indicator that equals 0 if a country is open in a given year or if it is closed
throughout the entire sample, and 1 otherwise. The negative and signiÞcant coeﬃcient
for IFL_off suggests that productivity dropped in countries that closed their Þnancial
markets compared to the countries that were open or remained closed ever. These results
prove that regime switches out of Þnancial liberalization have not the same, positive eﬀect
of switches into it. In columns 5-7, I control in alternative ways for the pre-reform trends
in TFP. In column 5 I decompose the dummy IFL_switch in two dummies for switches on
and oﬀ liberalization. In column 6, these dummies are no longer step dummies, but take
the form of a three-period linear trend in the three years prior to reforms. In both cases
their introduction does not aﬀect the signiÞcance of the coeﬃcient for Þnancial openness.
Column 7 reports the result from adding a pre-reform trend for each country that has
liberalized. Again, no signiÞcant changes occur with respect to the other regressions.
4.2 Cross-sectional analysis
To study the eﬀects of Þnancial openness on TFP and capital in the long run, I estimate
the following growth regressions:
dpi(t−25,t) = β0 + λpit−25 + β
0
1Xi(t−25,t) + γIFLi(t−25,t) + uit, (5)
where dpi(t−25,t) = 100
log(Pit)−log(Pit−25)
25 with p = log (P ), P ∈ {A,K}, and the regressors
indexed by (t− 25, t) are 25-year period averages. A coeﬃcient estimate λˆ < 0 indicates
that there is conditional convergence in productivity. The speed of convergence b can be
obtained from λ = −1001−eb2525 .
Table 3 reports the results for capital accumulation. The coeﬃcients for the capital
stock at the beginning of the period (k_25 ) are always negative and signiÞcant, suggesting
that, other thing equal, countries that start with a lower stock of capital experience a faster
growth of physical capital. While capital account liberalization does not aﬀect capital
accumulation, banking crises tend to have a negative impact on it.
The results for the growth rate of TFP in Table 4 support robustly the hypothesis of
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conditional convergence in productivity, with an implied speed of convergence between 1
and 2 per cent per year. The eﬀect of banking crises on TFP growth is negative and signif-
icant under all speciÞcations. Capital account liberalization has a positive and signiÞcant
coeﬃcient only under the basic speciÞcation (column1), and has no diﬀerent eﬀect across
countries that experienced banking crises and those that did not (column 2). The coeﬃ-
cient for a_25∗IFL, aimed at assessing whether Þnancial liberalization aﬀects the pace of
convergence, is nil in column 3. Column 5 suggests that the institutional factors captured
by GADP, together with initial productivity, are the most important determinant of TFP
growth. None of the other control variables seem to aﬀect productivity growth.
As emphasized by the empirical growth literature, cross-sectional estimates have sev-
eral limits. They do not allow me to exploit the time-series variation in the data on Þnan-
cial integration, which is important when assessing the eﬀects of the reforms; and cannot
control for omitted variables, country-speciÞc eﬀects and endogeneity of the regressors.
In this case, addressing endogeneity with an instrumental variable strategy looks rather
diﬃcult. Legal origins may be a good instrument for Þnancial development (see La Porta
et al, 1997), but do not seem particularly suitable to instrument a variable as IFL, which
involves policy changes and perhaps reversals over the sample. Bekaert et al. (2003)
address the issue by separately estimating a probit for IFL, and Þnd that the quality of
institutions is crucial in determining the choice of liberalization. But as the institutional
framework is known to be an important determinant of TFP (see, among others, Hall and
Jones, 1999), it does not seem a valid instrument for IFL, in a regression for TFP.
4.3 Dynamic panel analysis
To exploit the time variation in IFL, I could estimate equation (5) on a panel dataset,
assuming uit = ηi+ νt+ εit, but this would generate consistency problems. As the right-
hand side of equation (5) includes the lagged dependent variable (pt−τ ), even if εit is not
correlated with pt−τ , the estimates are not consistent, given the Þnite time span. Moreover,
consistency may be undermined by the endogeneity of other explanatory variables, as in the
cross-sectional estimates. To correct for the bias created by lagged endogenous variables,
and the simultaneity of some regressors, I follow the approach proposed by Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). I estimate the following system with GMM
dpit = β0 + θdpit−5 + β
0
1dXit + γdIFLit + dνt + dεit (6)
pit = β0 + θpit−5 + β
0
1Xi(t−5,t) + γIFLi(t−5,t) + ηi + νt + εit, (7)
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where dpit equals log( PitPit−5 ), and the other regressors are the same as in the previous
equations. Variables indexed by (t − 5, t) are averages over the period between t-5 and
t. ηi, νt and εit are the unobservable country- and time-speciÞc eﬀects, and the error
term, respectively. The presence of country eﬀect in equation (7) corrects the omitted
variable bias. The diﬀerences in equation (6) and the instrumental variables estimation
of the system are aimed at amending inconsistency problems. I instrument diﬀerences of
the endogenous and predetermined variables with lagged levels in equation (6) and levels
with diﬀerenced variables in equation (7). For instance, I take ait−15 as an instrument for
dait−5 and IFLit−10 for dIFLit in (6) and dait−10 as an instrument for ait−5 and dIFLit−5
for IFLit in (7). I estimate the system by two-step Generalized Method of Moments with
moment conditions E[dait−5s (εit − εit−5)] = 0 for s ≥ 2, and E[dzit−5s (εit − εit−5)] = 0
for s ≥ 2 on the predetermined variables z, for equation (6); E[dai,t−5s (ηi + εi,t)] = 0 and
E[dzi,t−5s (ηi + εi,t)] = 0 for s = 1 for equation (7). I treat all regressors as predetermined.
The validity of the instruments is guaranteed under the hypothesis that the residuals
from (6) are not second order serially correlated. Coeﬃcient estimates are consistent and
eﬃcient if both the moment conditions and the no-serial correlation are satisÞed. To
validate the estimated model, I apply a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, and a
test of second-order serial correlation of the residuals.17 As pointed out by Arellano and
Bond (1991), the estimates from the Þrst step are more eﬃcient, while the test statistics
from the second step are more robust. Therefore, I will report coeﬃcients and statistics
from the Þrst and second step respectively. Note that in this case the speed of convergence
b obtains from θ = e5b.
The dynamic panel estimates for k_5 in Table 5 conÞrm the prediction of the neoclas-
sical growth model, that capital accumulation slows down as capital grows up towards its
steady state value, and also that there is conditional convergence across countries. The
coeﬃcients for Þnancial liberalization (IFL) conÞrm the result from the cross-sectional
analysis. Banking crises (BC ) depress investments, though to a lesser extent in countries
with high initial capital stocks.
The estimates for a_5 in Table 6 conÞrm the cross sectional evidence of conditional
convergence in productivity. The implied speed of convergence is now higher than the one
in Table 4 and lies between 1.2 and 4.4 per cent per year. Capital account liberalization
spurs productivity growth in a robust way, while the negative eﬀect of banking crises is
now weaker. Trade does not seem to have a signiÞcant eﬀect on TFP growth. Columns
17 Including too many lags among the instruments can cause the power of the Sargan test to collapse,
potentially hiding the invalidity of instruments (see for example Bowsher, 2002). To avoid this problem, I
restrict the number of lags to t-10 and t-15.
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4-7 report the results for the interactions of Þnancial liberalization with banking crises,
and the interaction of both IFL and BC with the level of economic development and the
quality of institutions. Column 4 shows that the eﬀects of neither international Þnancial
liberalization nor banking crises change with the initial level of productivity. The coef-
Þcient on the interaction term in column 5 suggests that countries that were open when
experiencing a crisis had a worse performance in terms of TFP than countries that were
closed during the crisis. Column 6 shows that BC lowers TFP growth everywhere, while
IFL has positive eﬀects in developed and negative eﬀects in the developing countries.
The same holds in column 7, where I distinguish between countries with high and low
institutional quality, as measured by GADP.
The results above suggest that Þnancial liberalization has a positive direct eﬀect on
TFP but not on capital accumulation over a one to Þve year period. One can wonder
whether the eﬀect on capital accumulation takes longer to display, due, for instance to the
presence of adjustment costs. Table 7 reports results from estimating the system (6)-(7)
for capital, adding a lagged term of capital account liberalization. As reported in column
2, Þnancial integration spurs capital accumulation with one period lag. Is this lagged eﬀect
of Þnancial openness a direct one or is it that investments rise as a consequence of the
increase in TFP? The estimates in column 3, where I add TFP to the regressors of column
2, suggests that this is the case, since the coeﬃcient for IFLt−5 is no longer signiÞcant,
while the one for TFP is positive and signiÞcant.
4.4 Equity market liberalization
Finally, in Tables 8 and 9 I report the main results obtained when considering the indicator
of equity market liberalization by Bekaert et al. (2003) instead of the capital account
liberalization index. The positive eﬀects on TFP survive, but now also the positive eﬀects
on capital accumulation are signiÞcant, at least under some speciÞcations. This may
justify why the eﬀects of EML on growth are more signiÞcant than those of IFL in the
estimates by Bekaert et al. (2003).
5 Financial integration and banking crises
The analysis in the last section suggests that banking crises are detrimental for both
capital accumulation and productivity. It is often argued that banking crises, and Þnancial
instability in general, may be triggered by the removal of restriction on capital account
transactions. This section is aimed at evaluating if, and to what extent, the negative
eﬀects of banking crises should ultimately be imputed to Þnancial liberalization. To do so,
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I estimate on the annual panel dataset the following logit for the probability of a banking
crisis:
Pr (BC_typeit = 1) =
eβo+β1Xit+γIFLit
1 + eβo+β1Xit+γIFLit
.
The variable BC_typeit takes value one if a banking crisis of a given type (systemic,
borderline, or any) has occurred in country i at time t. The vector Xit includes a series of
covariates, and IFLit is the binary indicator of international Þnancial liberalization. To
appreciate the eﬀects of all covariates, I also estimate a multinomial logit for BCit, which
takes values 1 and 2 in case of borderline and systemic crises respectively, and zero when
no crises occur. I cluster the standard errors by country.
The Þrst two columns of Table 10 report the results for BC_all, which equals 1 if
any type of crisis has occurred, and 0 otherwise. The indicator of IFL has no signiÞcant
coeﬃcient estimates on the full sample. The variables raising the likelihood of crises the
most are high inßation and the existence of explicit deposit insurance, as already shown
by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). High real GDP per capita and growth rate of
Þnancial depth signiÞcantly reduce the probability of crisis. The Þrst result is in line with
the predictions in Martin and Rey (2004), while the second seems to contradict the bumpy
path hypothesis proposed by Ranciere et al. (2004) and Tornell et al. (2004). Splitting
the sample between developed and developing countries, I Þnd that IFL has a positive
eﬀect on the likelihood of banking crises in developed countries, while the growth rate of
private credit and the existence of deposit insurance are more important in developing
countries.
In Table 11, I exploit the classiÞcation in Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) and estimate
the eﬀects of all covariates on systemic versus borderline banking crises. IFL only has
a positive eﬀect on the likelihood of borderline banking crises in developed countries.
This positive coeﬃcient is explained by the fact that most banking crises in developed
countries are borderline. Deposit insurance, high real per capita GDP and the growth
rate of Þnancial depth mainly aﬀect the probability of systemic crises. High inßation has
opposite eﬀects on the likelihood of the two types of crises: negative for borderline and
positive for systemic crises.
Table 12 reports the marginal eﬀects on the likelihood of banking crises estimated with
dprobit. The coeﬃcients in columns 4 and 5 mean that Þnancial liberalization raises by
0.3 to 1.7 per cent the probability that a border line banking crisis arises. Coupled with
the coeﬃcient estimates for IFL and BC in Tables 1-7, this means that the overall eﬀect
of Þnancial integration on productivity remains largely positive.
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6 Discussion
The evidence in section 4 suggests that Þnancial integration is accompanied by an increase
in productivity, which is followed only with some lag by capital accumulation. This eﬀect
seems at odds with the theoretical predictions that Þnancial liberalization would raise
capital accumulation, and eventually raise TFP by relieving the economies from credit
constraints.
A plausible way to rationalize this result is to draw a parallel between Þnancial integra-
tion and trade openness. In particular, one can interpret Þnancial openness as integration
in the market for Þnancial services. In a world with market imperfections, Þnancial ser-
vices (such as screening, monitoring, debt structuring, etc.) can be seen as an important
factor of production for Þrms that need to raise external capital. Since the quality and
varieties of Þnancial services are likely to diﬀer across countries and sectors, Þnancial liber-
alization, may generate the well known gains from trade. Specialization allows Þrms in all
countries to buy any given Þnancial service at the best price. Moreover, the access to new
varieties of services may provide Þrms with the most appropriate Þnancial instruments,
which spurs productivity. This rise in TFP is due to an increase in allocative eﬃciency,
which is empirically documented by Galindo et al. (2005). The increase in TFP is not
necessarily accompanied by capital ßows across countries, but is most probably followed
by capital accumulation, as the evidence in the previous sections suggest. As another
consequence of Þnancial liberalization and specialization in Þnancial services, one should
observe Þnancial intermediaries enter foreign markets following comparative advantage
patterns, as recent evidence from microdata shows. For instance, the results in Focarelli
and Pozzolo (2000) suggest that foreign banks entry more often in countries where banks
are less eﬃcient, and Clarke et al. (1999) show that they tend to serve the sectors in which
they have comparative advantage. Moreover, Claessens et al. (2001) document an overall
eﬃciency gain in the Þnancial intermediation sector.
To the extent that better Þnancial services reduce the volatility in output (for in-
stance through eﬀective selection or monitoring of the borrowers), Þnancial integration
may reduce the volatility of aggregate production of a country. On the contrary, in the
models that see Þnancial globalization mainly as an international portfolio diversiÞcation
device (e.g. Obstfeld, 1994), Þnancial integration tends to promote risk taking at each
single country level, which raises output volatility. Table 13 reports results from OLS
regressions of the 1980-1999 sample standard deviation of log-GDP on the growth rate of
GDP and the indicators of IFL and banking crises. The negative and signiÞcant coeﬃ-
cients of IFL seem inconsistent with the prediction of Þnancial globalization raising output
volatility. The same holds for TFP in columns 5-8.
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Financial integration may also generate frictional unemployment due to the realloca-
tion of capital from less to more eﬃcient Þrms, as a consequence of the improvement in
the Þnancial services of screening and selection of borrowers. Looking at data on labor
and employment may be an interesting extension of the analysis in the present paper.
7 Conclusions
A wide literature has focused on the eﬀect of Þnancial liberalization on GDP growth, often
Þnding mixed results. To better understand the eﬀect of Þnancial liberalization, however, it
is important to know the channels through which it operates. This paper has attempted to
probe deeper into the relationship by separately studying the impact of Þnancial openness
on two sources of income growth: capital accumulation and productivity. Contrary to the
existing literature, I Þnd fairly robust results. In particular, Þnancial liberalization has a
positive direct eﬀect on productivity, while it spurs capital accumulation only with some
delay and indirectly, since capital follows the rise productivity.
In my analysis I took into account two possible indirect channels through which Þnan-
cial globalization may aﬀect economic performance: Þnancial development and banking
crises. The most interesting result applies to the latter factor. As expected, banking crises
have a strong negative impact on economic performance, though the likelihood that they
occur does not rise much under Þnancial integration. In fact, globalization raises only the
probability of minor crises in developed countries. Nevertheless, the positive direct eﬀect
of Þnancial liberalization on TFP survives.
Finally, the paper brießy discusses a possible explanation for the positive direct eﬀect
of Þnancial integration on productivity. The idea is that removing restrictions to inter-
national Þnancial transaction opens the door to trade in Þnancial services, which can be
considered as a production factor. As in trade models, openness generates gains from
specialization and widening of varieties, which raise eﬃciency in the allocation of capital
in each and every country, thereby fostering TFP growth. This mechanism is supported
by some existing evidence on the pattern of internationalization of Þnancial intermedi-
aries, and on the allocative eﬃciency of investments. Developing a theoretical foundation
of comparative advantage and diﬀerentiation in Þnancial services, and testing it seem
interesting directions for future research.
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Asia -0.121 19.156 ***
0.735 7.348
Latin America 1.825 *** 21.934 ***
0.588 7.580
Europe & N. America -0.105 -14.776 ***
0.891 8.107
developing 0.467 -0.305
0.453 1.111
gadp 2.745 0.147
2.309 3.380
growth -0.027 -7.073
5.614 5.288
inflation -1.555 *** -0.357 *
0.598 0.187
kg 0.077 -0.555
0.424 0.529
openk 0.284 0.707
0.297 0.549
privo -0.611 ** 0.059
0.256 0.541
rgdpch 1.099 1.112
0.798 0.839
BC -0.357 0.202
0.331 0.459
log(A) -1.039 -0.047
0.742 1.022
log(K) 0.027 -0.061
0.077 0.098
Observations 1240 1240
Table B
Financial liberalization - yearly panel 
Note. IFL_in and IFL_out indicate switches on and off
capital account liberalization, respectively. The coefficients
in theese columns are estimated with multinomial logit. Asia,
Latin America and Europe & N. America are continental
dummies. Developing is a dummy for developing countries
as defined by the World Bank. The variables growth,
inflation, gov, open, privo, rgdp and bc enter as lagged
values. A constant is included in all regressions. The robust
standard errors are clustered by country. *, ** and ***
indicate that a coefficiant is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per
cent level, respectively.
m-logit
IFL_outIFL_in
Asia Africa Latin America Europe & N. 
America
IFL_in 4 3 9 7
IFL_out 1 0 9 0
IFL 121 9 81 104
TFP growth 0.009 -0.014 -0.012 0.001
Capital accumulation 0.069 0.044 0.032 0.032
Observations 315 841 378 280
Countries 15 42 18 15
IFL and economic performance across continents
Note. Rows 1 and 2 report the number of switches into and out of capital account
liberalization (IFL_in and IFL_out). Line 3 reports the number of country-years with
IFL=1. The other lines report subsample means of TFP growth and capital
accumulation.
Table C
IFL 0.735 0.380 0.700 0.412 0.273 0.528 1.956 ** 0.099
0.625 0.762 0.623 0.761 0.802 0.955 0.779 1.340
BC -0.782 *** -0.702 *** -0.754 *** -0.500 * -0.473 -0.496
0.217 0.224 0.243 0.305 0.304 0.403
IFL*BC 0.326
0.599
lgov -2.528 *** -1.673 ** -3.700 ***
0.840 0.744 1.227
lprivo -1.021 * -1.239 ** -1.343 *
0.610 0.566 0.831
lrgdpch 5.036 *** 2.573 5.426 **
1.668 1.691 2.189
IFL_switch3 -0.350 -0.319 -0.314 0.043 -0.060 -0.113
0.709 0.707 0.707 0.891 0.874 1.174
Time-continent No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 1385 361 1024
Countries 93 93 93 93 93 79 20 59
Developed Developing
IFL 0.105 *** 0.053 ** 0.102 *** 0.033 * 0.026 0.076 *** 0.063 0.100 ***
0.019 0.022 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.044 0.028
BC -0.060 *** -0.053 *** -0.055 *** -0.055 *** -0.097 *** -0.047 ***
0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.016 0.008
IFL*BC 0.017
0.017
lprivo 0.029 ** -0.066 ** 0.065 ***
0.014 0.029 0.018
lopenk -0.018 0.055 -0.023
0.021 0.095 0.022
ipr 0.013 * 0.039 ** 0.002
0.008 0.018 0.010
IFL_switch3 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 0.019 -0.027 0.032
0.021 0.190 0.020 0.018 0.044 0.021
Time-continent No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1844 1844 1844 1844 1844 1119 309 810
Countries 93 93 93 93 93 73 18 55
Note. The dependent variable is the logaritm of TFP (log(A)). All regressors are in lagged values. The variable IFL_switch3
equals 1 in the 3 years prior to capital account reforms, zero elsewhere. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All
regressions include a constant. Standard errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant
at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.
Table 2a
Capital account liberalization and TFP - yearly panel - difference in difference
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Note. The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of physical capital stock (dlog(K)). All regressors are in lagged values.
The variable IFL_switch3 equals 1 in the 3 years prior to capital account reforms, zero elsewhere. The sample spans between
1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** indicate that a
coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.
1 7 8
Developed Developing
Table 1
Capital account liberalization and capital accumulation - yearly panel - difference in difference
3 42 5 6
IFL 0.083 *** 0.068 *** 0.069 *** 0.055 **
0.019 0.023 0.023 0.024
IFL_off -0.038 -0.048 **
0.026 0.025
BC -0.055 *** -0.059 *** -0.054 *** -0.049 *** -0.049 *** -0.049 ***
0.006 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007
lprivo 0.032 *** 0.070 *** 0.031 ** 0.028 ** 0.028 ** 0.032 **
0.014 0.021 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014
lopenk -0.016 0.005 -0.014 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002
0.021 0.035 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.022
ipr 0.015 * -0.013 0.015 * 0.013 * 0.013 * 0.013 *
0.008 0.013 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008
IFL_switch_on3 0.013
0.020
IFL_switch_off3 -0.013
-0.031
IFL_switch_on_trend 0.005
0.009
IFL_switch_off_trend 0.0002
0.014
Time-continent Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country pre-IFL trend No No No No No No Yes
Obs 1122 332 514 1119 976 976 976
Countries 73 20 40 73 70 70 70
Full Sample
Note. The dependent variable is the logaritm of TFP level (log(A)). All regressors are in lagged values. The
indicator IFL_off takes value 1 if the country is financially closed aa a result of a closing reform. The variables
IFL_switch_on3 and IFL_switch_off3 equal 1 in the 3 years prior to capital account opening and closing,
respectively. The same variables with _trend termination take value 1, 2 and 3 respectively 3, 2 and 1 year
prior to reform. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors
are clustered by country. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent,
respectively.
Table 2b
Capital account liberalization and TFP - yearly panel - difference in difference
Bertrand et al. (2004) 
correction
No closed 
countries 
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
1 2 3 4 5 6
k_25 -0.364 *** -0.371 *** -0.373 *** -0.391 *** -0.638 *** -1.218 ***
0.116 0.115 0.116 0.128 0.152 0.406
IFL 1.109 0.896 0.466 -2.145 0.018 -0.015
0.739 0.746 0.996 6.680 0.736 0.371
BC -1.498 ** -1.670 ** -1.511 ** -0.638 -1.151
0.745 0.803 0.754 0.934 0.711
IFL*BC 1.315
1.983
k_25*IFL 0.130
0.277
gadp 3.680 ***
1.183
lprivo 1.272 *** 0.307
0.407 0.304
lopenk -0.513 -0.165
0.493 0.276
lgov -0.286 0.155
0.583 0.291
R2 0.094 0.127 0.130 0.128 0.228 0.243
Obs 92 92 92 92 84 84
1 2 3 4 5 6
a_25 -0.746 * -0.559 * -0.560 * -0.573 * -1.008 *** -1.218 ***
0.438 0.321 0.324 0.328 0.403 0.406
IFL 1.739 ** 0.836 ** 0.588 -1.546 -0.110 -0.015
0.709 0.389 0.557 5.865 0.339 0.371
BC -1.369 * -0.148 * -1.350 * -1.264 * -1.151
0.749 0.841 0.755 0.798 0.711
IFL*BC 0.696
1.507
a_25*IFL 0.366
0.882
gadp 3.680 ***
1.183
lprivo 0.862 *** 0.307
0.232 0.304
lopenk -0.198 -0.165
0.296 0.276
ipr 0.315 0.155
0.282 0.291
R2 0.079 0.096 0.098 0.097 0.279 0.193
Obs 85 85 85 85 73 73
Table 3
Capital account liberalization and Capital accumulation - cross-section
Note. The dependent variable is the 25-year average annual growth rate of capital
(dlog(K)/25). All regressors are expressed as period average, except for the logaritm 
of the initial TFP level. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions
include a constant. Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients. *,
** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent,
respectively.
Note. The dependent variable is the 25-year average annual growth rate of TFP
(dlog(A)/25). All regressors are expressed as period average, except for the
logaritm of the initial TFP level. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All
regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors are reported below the
coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per 
cent, respectively.
Table 4
Capital account liberalization and TFP Growth - cross-section
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
k_5 0.900 *** 0.851 *** 0.892 *** 0.919 *** 0.913 *** 0.899 *** 0.897 ***
0.034 0.047 0.023 0.019 0.025 0.029 0.029
IFL 0.116 0.225 ** 0.005 -1.300 ** 0.113 0.126 0.153
0.082 0.104 0.040 0.526 0.077 0.138 0.162
BC -0.154 *** -0.076 *** -1.090 *** -0.127 *** -0.146 *** -0.376 **
0.033 0.028 0.310 0.026 0.031 0.167
lgov 0.010
0.066
lprivo 0.169 ***
0.046
lopenk -0.034
0.081
k_5*IFL 0.057 **
0.023
k_5*BC 0.043 ***
0.013
IFL*BC -0.092
0.108
IFL*dev'ing -0.003
0.236
BC*dev'ed 0.088
0.087
IFL*(1-gadp) -0.145
0.522
BC*gadp 0.428
0.283
Sargan (p-val) 0.396 0.565 0.522 0.233 0.169 0.195 0.230
m2 (p-val) 0.204 0.622 0.337 0.153 0.11 0.131 0.152
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 449 449 341 449 449 449 449
Countries 91 91 77 91 91 91 308
Table 5
Capital account liberalization and Capital accumulation - Dynamic Panel Data - System GMM
Note. The dependent variables are the 5-year log-difference and the end-of-period level of capital stock. All
regressors are log differences and levels of 5-year period averages. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All
regressions include a constant. The estimation is performed with the two-step system-GMM procedure. Coefficients 
and standard errors are reported from the first step. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5
and 1 per cent, respectively. The p-values for the Sargan overidentification test and the second order serial
correlation (m2) test are reported from the second step.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a_5 0.761 *** 0.747 *** 0.708 *** 0.785 *** 0.799 *** 0.759 *** 0.766 ***
0.078 0.083 0.074 0.101 0.076 0.078 0.081
IFL 0.148 ** 0.184 *** 0.138 ** -1.048 0.169 *** 0.298 *** 0.350 ***
0.064 0.067 0.064 2.121 0.060 0.086 0.122
BC -0.088 * -0.104 *** 0.398 -0.065 -0.088 * -0.094
0.047 0.039 0.600 0.047 0.051 0.232
lopenk -0.054
0.081
lprivo 0.060
0.038
a_5*IFL 0.181
0.323
a_5*BC -0.083
0.101
IFL*BC -0.296 ***
0.109
IFL*dev'ing -0.405 *
0.225
BC*dev'ed 0.014
0.129
IFL*(1-gadp) -0.915
0.584
BC*gadp 0.009
0.386
Sargan (p-val) 0.495 0.15 0.509 0.382 0.749 0.508 0.548
m2 (p-val) 0.695 0.98 0.840 0.512 0.627 0.642 0.659
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 433 433 329 433 433 433 433
Countries 89 89 75 89 89 89 89
Table 6
Capital account liberalization and TFP - Dynamic Panel Data - System GMM
Note. The dependent variables are the 5-year log-difference and the end-of-period level of TFP. All regressors are
log differences and levels of 5-year period averages. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions
include a constant. The estimation is performed with the two-step system-GMM procedure. Coefficients and
standard errors are reported from the first step. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1
per cent, respectively. The p-values for the Sargan overidentification test and the second order serial correlation
(m2) test are reported from the second step.
1 2 3
k_5 0.900 *** 0.834 *** 0.907 ***
0.034 0.055 0.023
IFL 0.116 -0.020 -0.068
0.082 0.119 0.060
BC -0.154 *** -0.159 *** -0.045
0.033 0.071 0.039
IFL_5 0.285 *** 0.087
0.135 0.059
a 0.304 ***
0.076
Sargan (p-val) 0.396 0.968 0.577
m2 (p-val) 0.204 0.839 0.580
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs 449 436 428
Countries 91 90 89
Table 7
Capital account liberalization and Capital accumulation - 
Dynamic Panel Data - System GMM
Note. The dependent variables are the 5-year log-difference and the end-
of-period level of capital stock. All regressors are log differences and
levels of 5-year period averages. The sample spans between 1975 and
1999. All regressions include a constant. The estimation is performed
with the two-step system-GMM procedure. Coefficients and standard
errors are reported from the first step. *, ** and *** indicate that a
coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The p-
values for the Sargan overidentification test and the second order serial
correlation (m2) test are reported from the second step.
k_t -0.709 *** 0.870 ***
0.233 0.037
EML 0.629 * 2.049 * 0.258 ***
0.339 1.172 0.099
BC -0.341 *** -0.667 -0.015
0.107 0.925 0.035
lgov -1.007 *** -0.225 0.102
0.338 0.629 0.097
lprivo -0.501 ** 1.958 *** 0.118 **
0.254 0.597 0.051
lrgdpch 3.511 ***
0.777
EML_switch3 0.422
0.298
lopenk -0.375 -0.084
0.479 0.091
GADP -5.909 **
2.423
Sargan (p-val) 0.352
m2 (p-val) 0.449
Time FE Yes No Yes
Time-Continent Yes No No
Obs 1026 72 260
Countries 69 72 68
Note: the regressions in this table replicate those of Table 1
col. 6, Table 3 col. 5, and Table 5 col. 3, replacing capital
account liberalization with equity market liberalization. For
all the other respect, refer to the originary tables. 
Table 8
Equity market liberalization and Capital accumulation 
Panel D-i-D Cross section DPD
a_t -1.004 *** 0.708 ***
0.384 0.074
EML 0.055 *** 1.304 * -0.058
0.021 0.830 0.119
BC -0.051 *** -1.150 * -0.093 **
0.007 0.720 0.045
lopenk -0.012 0.022 -0.098
0.026 0.255 0.078
lprivo 0.011 0.587 0.051
0.017 0.309 0.047
ipr 0.009 -0.222
0.008 0.324
EML_switch3 0.005
0.017
Sargan (p-val) 0.883
m2 (p-val) 0.312
Time FE Yes No Yes
Time-Continent Yes No No
Obs 814 65 253
Countries 67 65 67
Table 9
Equity market liberalization and TFP
Note: the regressions in this table replicate those of Table 2a
col. 6, Table 4 col. 5, and Table 6 col. 3, replacing capital
account liberalization with equity market liberalization. For
all the other respect, refer to the originary tables. 
Panel D-i-D Cross section DPD
1 2 3 4
IFL 0.213 0.202 1.587 *** -0.125
0.269 0.266 0.365 0.308
depins 0.640 ** 0.577 * 0.732 0.807 **
0.307 0.305 0.523 0.415
rrgdpch -0.410 -0.659 ** -0.907 * -0.941 **
0.304 0.283 0.524 0.451
inflation 0.000 * 0.001 * 0.007 *** 0.000 **
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
openk 0.001 0.002 0.016 * 0.000
0.003 0.003 0.009 0.004
privo -0.737
0.699
grprivo -1.817 *** 0.970 -2.926 ***
0.515 1.647 0.717
Obs 1117 283 961 830
1 2 3 4 5 6
BL SYS BL SYS BL SYS
IFL 0.716 * -0.187 1.921 ** 0.641 0.335 -0.330
0.406 0.366 0.804 0.791 0.577 0.399
depins -0.200 0.767 * 2.397 *** -0.844 -1.151 1.216 ***
0.495 0.428 0.674 1.630 1.025 0.447
rrgdpch 0.204 -1.168 ** 0.033 -2.442 ** 0.013 -1.143 **
0.410 0.496 0.446 1.029 0.752 0.575
inflation -0.025 * 0.001 ** -0.015 0.009 *** -0.018 0.000 **
0.013 0.000 0.029 0.003 0.012 0.000
openk 0.007 0.000 0.040 *** 0.014 0.008 -0.001
0.005 0.005 0.013 0.016 0.006 0.005
grprivo -1.423 -2.013 *** 3.642 ** 0.925 -2.118 ** -3.261 ***
1.126 0.538 1.769 2.166 1.074 0.788
Capital account liberalization and banking crises - yearly panel - mlogit
Developed Developing
Note. The dependent variable is an indicator of banking crises (BC ), that equals 2 if a systemic
crisis (SYS) occurs, 1 if the crisis is borderline (BL), and 0 otherwise. All regressors are in
lagged values. The estimation is performed with multinomial logit. Standard errors are clustered
by country. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent
respectively.
Table 10
Note. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of banking crises
(BC_all ), that equals 1 if a crisis occurs and 0 otherwise. All
regressors are in lagged values. Standard errors are clustered by
country. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10,
5 and 1 per cent respectively.
Financial liberalization and banking crises - yearly panel - logit
Table 11
Developed Developing
IFL 0.060 0.399 *** -0.015 0.017 ** 0.003 *** 0.006 -0.031 0.029 -0.035
0.055 0.079 0.060 0.018 0.024 0.019 0.046 0.120 0.054
depins 0.096 * 0.078 0.131 * -0.003 0.003 ** -0.034 ** 0.099 -0.113 0.218 ***
0.060 0.121 0.071 0.006 0.025 0.019 0.070 0.152 0.072
rgdpch -0.084 *** -0.129 ** -0.100 *** 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.850 *** -0.131 ** -0.099 ***
0.031 0.062 0.039 0.003 0.001 0.009 0.033 0.055 0.039
inflation 0.011 *** 0.166 *** 0.005 ** -0.038 ** -0.001 -0.048 0.010 *** 0.165 *** 0.006 **
0.004 0.055 0.002 0.019 0.009 0.016 0.003 0.071 0.002
openk 0.039 0.209 *** 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.009 0.003 0.006 -0.005
0.036 0.081 0.045 0.009 0.014 0.011 0.039 0.071 0.490
grprivo -0.325 *** 0.209 -0.573 *** -0.015 0.002 -0.036 -0.275 *** 0.085 -0.476 ***
0.095 0.352 0.130 0.019 0.015 0.034 0.077 0.281 0.122
Obs 1077 283 794 1077 283 794 1077 283 794
Table 12
Financial integration and banking crises - yearly panel - dprobit
Note. The dependent variable is an indicator of banking crises (BC_X ), that equals 1 if a crisis of type X occurs, 0 otherwise. Type ALL
refers to any banking crisis, BL to borderline and SYS to systemic crises. All regressors are in lagged values. The estimation is
performed with probit, and the coefficients quantify marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** indicate
that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent respectively, based on a z-statistics. Since IFL and depins are dummies, the
significance of their coefficients refer to the test on the null that the underlying coefficient is zero.
Full Sample Full SampleDeveloped DevelopedDeveloping Developing
95 83 7
SYSBL
Developed Developing
ALL
6
Full Sample
1 42
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
IFL -0.050 ** -0.055 * -0.061 ** -0.042 *
0.023 0.029 0.029 0.023
EML -0.066 *** -0.081 *** -0.024 *** 0.002
0.004 0.018 0.006 0.023
BC 0.058 ** 0.043 *** 0.034 0.037
0.029 0.015 0.022 0.25
dlog(GDP) 3.013 *** 4.024 *** 3.749 *** 4.691 ***
1.200 1.377 0.138 0.436
dlog(a) -1.147 -1.819 ** -0.001 -0.021 ***
0.764 0.810 0.024 0.006
R2 0.387 0.508 0.535 0.659 0.102 0.252 0.38 0.405
Obs 121 96 92 79 114 93 70 70
Table 13
Note: OLS regressions of the standard deviation of log-real GDP per capita on the means of IFL, EML, BC and 
GDP growth over the period 1980-1999. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate that 
coefficients are significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively.
sd(logGDP) sd(logTFP)
Financial integration and volatility - Cross-section (1980-2000)
